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  The traditional narrative of events following the ratification debates has 
connected the Bill of Rights with the Anti-Federalists and the Judiciary and Process Acts 
of 1789 with the Federalists. Although the scholarly consensus has turned against the 
Bill of Rights part of this story, most scholars continue to portray the first Congress’ 
implementation of Article III as a victory for the Federalists. In this article, I trace the 
development of the Anti-Federalists’ theory of federal/state power and its application to 
the judiciary in an effort to show why the second part of the above narrative also has it 
wrong. 
Here is the short version. Having adopted the same conception of federalism as an 
underappreciated faction of delegates at the Constitutional Convention, Anti-Federalist 
writers like “Brutus” argued that some mechanism was needed to prevent the states 
from being swallowed up by federal judicial overreach. Despite Alexander Hamilton’s 
attempts in Federalist Nos. 78–83 to downplay this danger and emphasize the necessity 
of a robust system of federal inferior courts with general “arising under” jurisdiction, it 
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was the Anti-Federalists’ arguments that continued to resonate in the state ratifying 
conventions and beyond. Oliver Ellsworth, the Connecticut Federalist who was the 
primary draftsman of the Judiciary and Process Acts, had shown his sympathy with 
Brutus all along. And the bare bones, state-dependent inferior court structure he helped 
create is testimony to this sympathy. Like the Bill of Rights, then, the Anti-Federalists’ 
influence on the original federal judiciary was a vicarious one. But unlike the Bill of 
Rights, this victory tracked their theory of federalism and gave them a meaningful 
structural change that might protect the states against a national consolidation.
INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, if the Anti-Federalists were remembered for any enduring 
contribution to the American system of government, it was for the Bill of Rights. The 
Anti-
failed, so the traditional narrative went. But because of the numerous objections they 
raised at state ratifying conventions especially in the colonial power-centers of 
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia the Anti-
congressional approval of what would eventually become the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution.  
In recent years, however, scholars have thrown cold water on this account.1 It was 
not Anti-Federalists like Melancton Smith, Patrick Henry, or Richard Henry Lee who 
drafted the Bill of Rights and shepherded it through Congress; it was James Madison, the 
Federalist-of-Federalists himself. And although the Bill of Rights did respond to some of 
the Anti-
amendments declined to address the Anti-
concerns.2
But if the Anti-  of Rights has too often been 
exaggerated, scholars have regularly underappreciated their impact on another of the 
the establishment of the 
original federal judiciary in the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789. Consider Matthew 
a substantial victory . . . for the Federalist vision of a self-sufficient national 
3 iose claim repeated in Hart and 
4
the First Judiciary Act [was] the establishment for this country of the tradition of a 
5 Even Julius Goebel, whose classic work on the 
1. See, e.g., ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION (1997). 
 2. As Goldwin summarizes, [t]hat there is a bill of rights in the Constitution we owe in considerable part 
to the Anti-Federalists and their energetic agitation for amendments; but that we have the Bill of Rights we 
have, rather than a number of quite different amendments, we owe in larger part . . . to James Madison. Id. at 
57. 
 3. Matthew Brogdon, Constitutional Text and Institutional Development: Contesting the Madisonian 
Compromise in the First Congress, 5 AM. J. POL. THOUGHT 219, 236 (2016). 
4. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 21 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015).  
 5. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE 
2
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Judiciary and Process Acts is more balanced in its treatment of the Anti-Federalists, 
 . . . charged with drafting 
6
These portrayals fail to see the forest for the trees. The key takeaway is not that the 
Judiciary Act established some inferior courts a point which important Anti-Federalists 
conceded during the ratification debates7 and which may even have been required by 
Article III8 but that it granted state courts the primary responsibility for interpreting 
and applying federal law. 
jurisdiction for the national judiciary severely undercut their vision for a separate and 
self-sustaining national government that would act directly on individuals. And the first 
Process Act and the measures in the Bill of Rights that address the courts represent 
additional concessions to the Anti-  In short, instead of being 
remembered as a victory 
Article III is best characterized as an effort to address the Anti- concerns that 
the federal judiciary might destroy state governments and oppress individual rights.  
Why have scholars regularly undersold the Anti-
initial shape of the American judiciary? There are several good reasons. For one, as 
alluded to above, the Judiciary and Process Acts were written almost exclusively by 
Federalists. Oliver Ellsworth, a prominent Connecticut Federalist and future Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was the primary draftsman of both 
measures.9 Moreover, with the exception of a few Anti-Federalist mainstays, such as 
Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson (both from Virginia), the Federalists dominated 
the first Senate and indeed the first Congress as a whole. Of course, not all Federalists 
shared the same reasons for voting for the new Constitution, nor did they share an 
identical vision for its operation going forward.10 Nor, further, should it be forgotten that 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 4 (1928). 
6. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 457 (1971). To be sure, Goebel does eventually nod in the 
direction of the Federalists  sensitivity to the Anti-Federalists  criticisms. Id. But he misfires from the outset in 
suggesting that the Federalists who drafted the Judiciary Act were antagonistic to the Anti-Federalists  theory 
of federal/state power. 
7. See, e.g., Federal Farmer XV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE
130 31 (Michael P. Zuckert & Derek Webb eds., 2009) (opining that Congress would adopt either the New 
York or Massachusetts plan for inferior federal courts). 
 8. I take no position in this article on the meaning of Article III and, specifically, whether it required the 
creation of some federal inferior courts. But if the scholars who make this claim (or something close to it) are 
right, it would only add further support for my argument that the Judiciary and Process Acts were a victory for 
the Anti-Federalists. See William Treanor, Framer’s Intent: Gouverneur Morris, the Committee of Style, and 
the Creation of the Federalist Constitution 99 101 (Georgetown University Law Center, Working Paper, 2019) 
(arguing that Gouverneur Morris selected language that would require the creation of lower federal courts); see 
generally Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 
WIS. L. REV. 39 (1995) (arguing that the mainstream view during the founding era was that, because state 
courts could not constitutionally hear some categories of claims, Congress would need to create inferior federal 
courts if it wanted these claims to be enforced). 
9. See, e.g., GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 459 60. 
 10. I develop and support this claim throughout the rest of the article, but my most direct treatment of this 
point appears in the context of the discussion of Hamilton in Part III below. 
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Notwithstanding all of this, however, the fact remains that the Anti-
on the federal judiciary is one that must largely be traced through the hands of their 
political opponents.  
Another possible explanation for the Anti- gnition owes to 
the dearth of records from the first session of the Senate. Until 1794, the Senate met in 
secret. 
inferred from such sources as the personal correspondence of Senators, scattered (and 
often one-sided) notes of the proceedings like those taken by William Maclay, and the 
debates about the Judiciary and Process Acts that took place in the House of 
Representatives. As previously noted, all accounts suggest that Senate Federalists
including especially Ellsworth, William Paterson, and Caleb Strong were almost 
exclusively responsible for drafting these acts, and we also know that many Anti-
Federalists in the Senate voted against the Judiciary Act in its final form.11 So it is 
possible that the Senate records would fail to reveal evidence of Anti-Federalist 
influence even if they did exist. On the other hand, Richard Henry Lee was a member of 
the committee that prepared the first draft of the Judiciary Act and was even tasked with 
12
One final factor that has clouded the Anti-
not all) of the judicially-focused provisions enacted by the first Congress whether 
contained in the Bill of Rights, Judiciary Act, or Process Act are often taken for 
granted. Should an appellate court be able to reach a different conclusion about the facts 
of a case than the jury did below? This question sounds so strange because the Seventh 
Amendment settled this issue after its ratification in 1791. Similarly, such questions as 
whether the United States should have chancery courts, whether there is a jury trial right 
applicable in civil cases, and whether litigants need to fear being hauled into court in 
Washington, D.C. for run-of-the-mill matters rarely (if ever) arise today.  
So what basis is there for questioning the Federalist-centered narrative surrounding 
the original federal judiciary? My claim is that, despite their Federalist authorship, the 
Judiciary and Process Acts incorporated the Anti-
specifically their brand of federalism. To develop this argument, I identify a particular 
theory of federalism at the Constitutional Convention, trace how that theory was 
embraced by the Anti-Federalists and applied to the topic of the federal judiciary by 
13
11. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 459 60, 503, 507; WILLIAM J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE 
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 213 14 
n.10 (1990) (noting that bill s manuscript was in the handwriting of Ellsworth, Paterson, and Strong). On the 
topic of why several Anti-Federalists might have voted against a bill that accommodated many of their 
concerns, see infra pp. 27 28, 35 36 and accompanying notes. 
 12. Senate Legislative Journal (Apr. 7, 1789), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1972); Senate 
Legislative Journal (June 12, 1789), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 67 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1972); GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 466 67
(noting the strange fact that Lee, likely the most prominent Anti-Federalist in the Senate, was chosen to report 
the original bill). 
 13. Brutus was most likely Melancton Smith or one of his close associates. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
4
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compromises at state ratifying conventions, and then finally demonstrate how the theory 
made its way into the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789. Ultimately, I contend that the 
Anti-
pressure that the state ratifying conventions placed on those who drafted and voted on 
affiliation, his sympathy with the Anti-  him closer to 
Brutus than Hamilton. Like the Bill of Rights, then, the Anti-
the judiciary was a vicarious one. Yet, unlike the Bill of Rights, the Judiciary and 
Process Acts actually incorporated the Anti- ederal/state power, 
and, along the way, accomplished some of the structural changes the Anti-Federalists 
really wanted.  
There is one important qualification to this portrayal, however. Namely, with the 
exception of the judicially-related provisions of the Bill of Rights that made it into the 
Constitution itself, the Anti-  A detailed 
account of the growth of the federal judiciary is well beyond the scope of this article, but 
it is worth noting that, although the structure established by the Judiciary Act went 
largely unchanged until the Reconstruction era, the Anti-
the guiding principles of the Act in the Constitution allowed the national judiciary to 
eventually become something closer to what the Federalists would have wanted.14 In this 
way, the Judiciary and Process Acts might simultaneously be portrayed as a temporary 
Anti-Federalist victory in that the national judiciary was originally weak and state-
dependent, and a long-term victory for the Federalists in that the limitations on the 
judiciary provided by these acts were reversible. 
These insights also have contemporary relevance. Beyond at least partially 
fiable class of losers in 
15 some scholars have already demonstrated how the typical 
Federalist-centered narrative surrounding these Acts has confused such issues as the 
16 and whether federal courts 
should create federal common law.17
WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at xi xxxii, 397 419. 
14. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 28 29 (discussing the changes to the federal judiciary 
accomplished in Reconstruction era). See also William M. Treanor, The Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of 
the Modern Theory of the Judiciary, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST 503 05 (Jack Rakove & 
Colleen Sheehan eds., 2020) (arguing that Hamilton s theory has been adopted by contemporary scholars and 
practitioners). To be sure, while the Federalists wanted a stronger federal judiciary relative to the Anti-
Federalists, this does not therefore establish that all Federalists would embrace the degree to which the 
judiciary has expanded in the modern system. 
 15. Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, if Anything, from the 
Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 892 (2001). 
16. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1004, 1108 12
(2013) (arguing that, contrary to Printz v. United States, the Anti-Federalists  support for commandeering
suggests that the commandeering of state executive and judicial officers should not be categorically
unconstitutional ). 
 17. See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in 
Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609 (2015) (arguing that the Process 
Acts of 1789 and 1792, which required federal courts to use state forms of proceeding when hearing common 
law cases, reveal the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain Court s mistake in assuming that federal courts originally 
5
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matters is the longstanding debate over congressional power to limit the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.18 It would require more time and care to explore the implications of 
my thesis for that debate. 
implementation is relevant to its interpretation, a more Anti-Federalist-friendly 
understanding of the Judiciary and Process Acts would seem to militate in favor of 
permitting Congress greater flexibility in transferring power from federal to state courts. 
Lastly, recognition of the Anti-
stands to breathe new life into conversations about the Anti-
theories of constitutional and/or statutory interpretation. Some have argued that because 
Anti-
irrelevant to interpretations of founding era laws, or that they are relevant only to the 
same degree as other public texts that reveal the meanings people at the time would have 
ascribed to certain words.19 Placing the Anti-
column should cause further reflection about the degree to which their contributions 
form part of the canon for constitutional and/or statutory interpretation in the founding 
era. 
This article proceeds in the following manner. In Part I, I set the stage for the 
ratification debates by examining the increasing importance of the judiciary throughout 
the Constitutional Convention as well as the diverse theories of federalism articulated by 
the delegates. In Part II, I examine the Anti-
overreach in the months following the Convention with a special focus on Brutus. In Part 
response to 
Brutus, as well as the debates over Article III at the state ratifying conventions. And, 
fin
and the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789.  
I. ARTICLE III AND COMPETING STRATEGIES FOR NEGOTIATING FEDERAL/STATE
CONFLICT AT THE CONVENTION
There is near-universal agreement among scholars that the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787 did not view Article III as a high priority, at least not 
initially. 
judiciary . . . t[ook] a back 20
less critical working over than the other departments of gover 21 Hart and 
Wechsler go even further, 
consulted ambient  or general  law). 
18. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 307 (where Hart and Wechsler distinguish between (1) the power 
of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts ; (2) the power of Congress to limit the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases that continue to be within the jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts ; and (3) the power of Congress to withdraw certain matters from the jurisdiction of all federal 
courts (with state courts continuing to exercise jurisdiction over those matters).
19. See generally Nils Gilbertson, Return of the Skeptics: The Growing Role of the Anti-Federalists in 
Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 255 (2018) (summarizing various positions 
on the Anti-Federalists  relevance to Constitutional interpretation). 
 20. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 236 (2010). 
21. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 205. 
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the judiciary [at the Convention] were ancillary, and reflected settlements and divisions 
22
While this last characterization may go a bit too far, these claims invite an 
important question: Why did the delegates arrive at the Convention with such little 
concern for the judiciary? Bearing in mind the diverse size and population of the states as 
well as the critical importance of delimiting the powe
the most obvious explanation might be that the structure of the legislative and executive 
branches were more pressing concerns. Also, considering, first, that the Continental 
revising
23 and, second, that the Articles had established only a 
very limited national court system, many delegates were likely less focused on the 
judiciary because of this point of departure.24
and one that is 
especially relevant to the present inquiry might be that it was several months before the 
delegates shifted their attention toward the judiciary as the means for addressing the 
classic problem for governments with a federal structure: How should the system 
negotiate conflicts between national and state governments?  
Many delegates at the convention, and especially James Madison, were originally 
occupied with a potential legislative solution to this problem.25
any state enactment 
before it became effective.26 And the Virginia Plan, which Madison helped craft, 
recommended providing Congress with a similar power, but first would have required 
 . . the articles of the 
27 Convention records suggest that Madison was very committed to these 
22. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
 23. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774 1789, at 74 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) (emphasis 
added); but see GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 201 02 (arguing that the Continental Congress did not give this 
authority to the Convention because they knew they could not add anything to the states  own respective 
decisions to send delegates to the Convention). 
 24. Even the New Jersey Plan, however, would have established a federal court system with power to 
review state court decisions. Thus, it is probable that most delegates began the Convention assuming that the 
new proposal would include a federal judiciary of some kind. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 611 16 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 3 FARRAND]. 
25. See, e.g., ALLISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 147 58 (Harvard 
University Press 2010); Michael Zuckert, Federalism and the Founding: Toward a Reinterpretation of the 
Constitutional Convention, 34 REV. POL. 166 210 (1986). 
 26. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787) ( [A] negative in all cases 
whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to 
me to be absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions. ). 
 27. 3 FARRAND, supra note 24, at 593 94. Some characterize this portion in the Virginia Plan (which 
Madison helped craft) as a different federal negative,  thus presenting Madison as having proposed two 
distinct negatives. See Michael Zuckert, Judicial Review and the Incomplete Constitution: A Madisonian 
Perspective on the Supreme Court and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 61 64 (Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009). This portrayal can be helpful because, as 
explored further below, it helps highlight how Madison sought for this provision to solve two different 
problems. The Virginia Plan s congressional veto of state enactments contravening the articles of the union was 
specifically designed to ensure that states did not impinge on national interests. And Madison s unqualified 
congressional veto power over state laws was a key part of solving the problem of large republics discussed in 
Federalist No. 10 because as compared to the state legislatures Madison thought Congress would represent 
a broader diversity of constituencies and interests, making congressional majorities less factious than those 
7
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provisions. Not only did he repeatedly attempt to convince the other delegates of the 
necessity of some type of Congressional veto power over state laws, he also famously 
provision seems to have been mortal to the antient [sic] Confederacies, and to be the 
28
letter to Jefferson is any indication, the absence of a congressional veto power from the 
plan was his deepest regret.29
during the Convention and to appreciate why Madison felt so strongly about his 
er strategies 
presented at the Convention for balancing state and federal power. Coming fresh off of a 
disillusioning experience with the Articles of Confederation, almost every delegate 
agreed that some adjustment in favor of a stronger national government was necessary to 
preserve the Union. This, of course, led those on the one extreme like Alexander 
Hamilton to suggest a truly unified national government in which the states would give 
up all of their sovereignty.30 But even the most pro-state-power plan advanced during the 
summer of 1787 granted the national 
government some additional powers targeted especially at better regulating commerce, 
taxes, and foreign affairs.31 The New Jersey Plan thus represents the lightest-touch 
approach toward reforming the Articles of Confederation, all along seeking to preserve 
individual) level.32
Madison was the person who perhaps best saw the difficulty inherent in the New 
theoretical foundation. Yet, before turning to Madison, it is worth first noting how the 
architects of the New Jersey Plan themselves attempted to address the problem of state-
level defiance of national law that had so plagued the Articles of Confederation. 
Executive the power to compel, by use of all necessary military force, the obedience of 
noncomplying States.33 And while this power appears on its face to be in significant 
apparently to make incursions on the states a rare (and desperate) measure.34 Only in 
cases where enforcement was worth risking armed conflict would the national 
found in the states. Id. at 62 63. Congress thus needed this strong veto power to be able to adequately protect 
the rights of citizens. Id.
 28. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787). 
 29. LACROIX, supra note 25, at 136 39, 158 59; Zuckert, supra note 25, at 187. 
 30. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 198 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 283
86 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND]).
 31. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 242 45. 
 32. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 169 70. 
 33. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 245 ( [I]f any State, or any body of men in any State shall oppose or 
prevent [the] carrying into execution [of] such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call 
forth [the] power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an 
obedience to such Acts. ). 
 34. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 170 71. 
8
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government act against the will of member states. 
Three other conceptions of federalism represented at the Convention those 
embraced by the Virginia Plan, James Madison, and John Dickinson respectively
focused their efforts at negotiating the conflict between national and state governments 
in a more peaceful manner.35 And the similar strategy they adopted for solving this 
problem is what generated much of the Consti 36
Contrary to the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Plan began with the premise that 
both national and state governments should operate at the individual level with power 
over different objects, so that they would essentially act on separate planes with the 
points of contact between the two being as limited as possible.37 In this way, the two 
generally independent and self-sustaining levels of government could minimize the 
avenues through which government-on-government conflict would arise. Thus, under the 
Virginia Plan, the national and state governments each possessed their own robust 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches; Congress was given limited powers to 
accomplish national objects; and the national government was otherwise to stay out of 
state government affairs.38
For Madison, however, this type of separation by itself was insufficient. Having 
recently reflected, in anticipation of the Convention, upon the failures of ancient 
confederacies, Madison was especially concerned with state encroachment on the 
national government.39 Unless some mechanism existed through which the national 
government could exercise a degree of agency in state government proceedings, 
confrontation between the two spheres would ultimately be unavoidable. Much like his 
analysis in Federalist No. 51 concerning the need for each branch of government to have 
some mechanism to protect itself from the other branches to preserve the separation of 
powers,40 here, Madison held that the integrity of federal and state governments would 
be short-lived unless the national government had an effective way of protecting its own 
turf.41
 35. Note, on this point, that the Virginia Plan included a similar provision permitting the National 
Legislature  to compel state compliance by force if necessary. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 21 ( [T]he 
National Legislature ought to be impowered [sic] . . . to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of 
the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof ). But Madison makes clear in a number of places 
his belief that the primary method of securing state compliance and the only one that could actually be 
successful was the construction of a self-sufficient national government armed with something like the 
federal negative. See, e.g., James Madison Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787); see generally Zuckert, 
supra note 25. 
36. See generally FEDERALIST NOS. 15, 16. 
37. See id.; Zuckert, supra note 25, at 181 82. 
 38. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 20 23. 
39. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 361 69 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901); James Madison, On Ancient and Modern Confederacies 
(1786), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 369 90 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
40. FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 267 72 (James Madison). 
41. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787) ( Without this defensive power 
[(i.e. the federal negative)] experience and reflection have satisfied me that however ample the federal powers 
may be made, or however [c]learly their boundaries may be delineated, on paper, they will be easily and 
continually baffled by the Legislative sovereignties of the States ). 
9
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Congress to veto only unconstitutional state laws) constituted one notable exception to 
 The danger of state encroachment was 
such that the national government needed to actually insert itself into the routine 
procedure by which states made law so that federal oversight was not the exception but 
the rule. 
As it turns out, however, Madison would have undoubtedly preferred the Virginia 
 As Michael 
Zuckert notes by way of explaining the defeat of the federal negative: 
impressing on his colleagues the new principle that should govern the operation of the new 
constitution: that one level of government (the general government) should not operate on 
the other level of government (the states), but rather on individuals. ved 
negative would [have] violate[d] his own principle . . . .42
Ultimately, then, one might say that the core tenet of the Madison-inspired Virginia Plan 
negative. 
If the Virginia Plan generally sought to minimize the points of contact between 
two separate and self-
federalism permitted federal agency within state decision-making, this logically leaves 
room for one final theory of federalism. 
minimize the points of possible federal/state conflict but, contrary to Madison, sought to 
grant state agency in federal decision-making.43 For those subscribing to this view, 
federal encroachment on state power was just as dangerous as the opposite threat. In this 
worry, Dickinson Federalists like George Mason anticipated a common Anti-Federalist 
government to swallow up the states. As Mason stated at the Convention: 
[W]hatever power may be necesary [sic] for the Natl. Govt. a certain portion must 
necessarily be left in the States. . . . The State Legislatures also ought to have some means 
of defending themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl. Govt. In every other department 
we have studiously endeavored to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States 
alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide 
than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Natl. 
Establishment.44
A second concern for those in this camp, beyond the danger of federal overreach, 
was that the states would fail to check the federal government in any meaningful way if 
they were excluded from federal lawmaking procedures. Quoting Dickinson himself: 
The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will 
produce the collision between different authorities which should be wished for in order to 
check each other. . . . 
 42. Zuckert, supra note 27, at 64. 
 43. Zuckert, supra note 25, at 199. 
 44. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 155. 
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into one great current pursuing the same cours 45
For Dickinson Federalists, the primary means for accomplishing this state defense 
and federal check was to grant each state equal voting power in the Senate and task state 
legislatures with electing federal senators. This strategy, famously manifested in the 
Connecticut Compromise, is often attributed to Roger Sherman.46 But Sherman was not 
alone, even in Connecticut, in pushing for this plan. The other two Connecticut 
delegates, William Samuel Johnson and eventual Judiciary Act architect Oliver 
Ellsworth also vociferously backed the compromise. And, in fact, throughout the course 
of the Convention, it was Ellsworth instead of Sherman who eventually assumed the role 
47 regularly going toe-to-toe 
with Madison,48 Hamilton,49 and Wilson50 in floor debates about the plan. 
to his later work on the Judiciary Act. But, for present purposes, suffice it to say that his 
conduct evinces not only a commitment to the importance of state agency in the national 
government, but also a sympathy toward several arguments eventually made by Anti-
Federalists. Consider, in this regard, just two of Ellsworth
Philadelphia. 
First, as part of the debate surrounding the Connecticut Compromise, in the days 
nd vote to assign the question to be resolved by a 
committee of the delegates, Oliver Ellsworth rose multiple times to challenge various 
 In a June 25th speech, for 
example, Ellsworth responded to 
to grant state legislatures the power to elect federal senators. Specifically, Wilson had 
and as support for this approach continued:
The election of the 2d. branch by the Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests 
& local prejudices. The Genl. Govt. is not an assemblage of States, but of individuals for 
certain political purposes it is not meant for the States, but for the individuals composing 
them: the individuals therefore not the States, ought to be represented in it . . . .51
This was a model presentation of Virginia Plan federalism. In reply, Ellsworth 
urged, contrary to Wilso
52 -operation it would be impossible to support a 
53
45. Id. at 152 53. 
46. See BEEMAN, supra note 20, at 150 51. 
47. See MICHAEL C. TOTH, FOUNDING FEDERALIST: THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 57 58 (2011). Toth 
suggests that Sherman and Ellsworth formed a special partnership in the effort towards the compromise, with 
Sherman planting the seeds of a possible middle way, and Ellsworth, the seasoned litigator, taking on the role 
of persuader in chief. Id. 
48. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 463 65, 468 69, 471 72, 474 77, 485 86, 490 92. 
49. Id. at 465 67, 468 69, 472 75, 477. 
50. Id. at 405 07, 413 15, 416 17. 
51. Id. at 406 (emphasis in original). 
52. Id.
53. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 406. 
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54 A June 29 speech, responding to Madison and others, further illustrates 
-level role in the national government: 
[P]roportional representation in the first branch [of Congress] was conformable to the 
national principle & would secure the large States agst. the small. An equality of voices [in 
the Senate] was conformable to the federal55 principle and was necessary to secure the 
Small States agst. the large . . . . [L]arge States . . . would notwithstanding the equality of 
votes, have an influence that would maintain their superiority . . . . The power of self-
defense was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the 
creation.56
directly in protecting small states from large state (as opposed to national) 
encroachments. 
pl
conception of federalism. 
concerns his support for other mechanisms tethering Congress to the states. One example 
or his 
consistent endorsement of measures allowing the states themselves to determine the 
qualifications for candidates and voters.57 As Toth summarizes: 
While other framers favored setting strict national standards for matters such as the 
eligibility for voting in congressional elections, Ellsworth supported giving local 
constituents wide discretion over the rules that would determine who would participate in 
 In the face of pressure by nationalist delegates for the creation of 
a centrally regulated political marketplace, Ellsworth advanced a locally regulated one.58
ce for connecting 
Congress with the states was his endorsement, along with his Connecticut colleague 
Roger Sherman, of a one-year term for members of the House of Representatives. 
ion), 
Sherman remarked in language anticipating one of the most quintessentially Anti-
Federalist arguments advanced during the ratification debates59 that 
54. Id. at 407. 
 55. Ellsworth s use of federal  here is of course meant in contrast to the use of national  in the previous 
sentence, thus highlighting how his plan for equal representation in the Senate would respect state sovereignty. 
 56. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 468 69. 
 57. TOTH, supra note 47, at 69 82. 
58. Id. at 71. 
59. See, e.g., Federal Farmer VII, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH 
CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 70 (cautioning that there is a tendency in every society to confer on one part [of 
society] the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme form of weakness and 
misery ); Brutus IV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 
191 ( The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to 
whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people 
do, who transfer to them their authority ); HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 17
(1981) (noting that the Anti-Federalists generally wanted representatives to be directly answerable to and 
dependent on their constituents  by way of short terms of office, frequent rotation, and a numerous 
representation ). 
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[He] preferred annual elections . . . [because] representatives ought to return home and mix 
with the people. By remaining at the seat of Govt. they would acquire the habits of the 
place which might differ from those of their Constituents.60
One final notable, but more complex, example of this state government sympathy 
embers of Congress actually be paid by the states 
rather than by the national treasury.61 In defense of this proposal as applied to the House 
of Representatives, on June 22, Ellsworth pointed to the different norms and standards of 
living in different states as a reason for letting each state decide its own salary for its 
national representatives.62 And on June 26, in the Senate context, Ellsworth argued that 
63 By the time this measure was 
64 But Ellswo
localist leanings. 
To return to the thread with which this section began, by the end of July, not only 
into state decision-making, in fact, through the Connecticut Compromise and related 
developments, the national legislative branch had become the home for state agency in 
federal decision-making. This reversal of fortunes goes a long way towards explaining 
 But it also brings us to an important point in the 
have convinced the delegates that it was necessary to have some device to protect against 
state abuses. Having closed the door on legislative solutions for protecting the federal 
government against state encroachment, the delegates turned to the judiciary.65
Critically, the delegates decided that using the judiciary to prevent state overreach would 
strike the right balance between the two layers of government and would be most 
palatable to the states. 
for the final time, discussion turned to what would eventually become the Supremacy 
Clause.66 And within four days of finalizing the language of the Supremacy Clause, the 
Convention revised the language of Article III, adding among other things the ability 
of f 67 If something like 
 60. 1 FARRAND, supra note 30, at 362; see also id. at 365 (Yates  notes of Sherman s speech). 
61. Id. at 371 72, 74 (with regard to the House of Representatives), 427 (with regard to the Senate). 
62. Id. at 371. Here, in response to (especially Hamilton s) criticism of this proposal, Ellsworth also makes 
the more pragmatic point that this arrangement would increase the chances of the Constitution s ratification by 
the states. Id. at 374, 379 ( If I return to my state and tell them, we made such and such regulations for a 
general government, because we dared not trust you with any extensive powers, will they . . . adopt your 
government? ). 
63. Id. at 427. 
 64. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 290 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 
FARRAND]. 
 65. LACROIX, supra note 25, at 161; see also Zuckert, supra note 27, at 57, 64 69. 
66. See LACROIX, supra note 25, at 161 62. 
67. Id. at 163 64. 
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federalism had found a new, albeit unexpected, home in the federal judiciary.  
Yet there is one key caveat to this characterization. Despite establishing (even if 
creation of inferior federal courts famously left a blank space where most of the details 
of the judiciary might have been included. Thus, considering that the judiciary now 
that this issue was fated to become a flashpoint in the upcoming ratification debates. In 
short, even if Hart and Wechsler were correct to suggest that the federal judiciary was 
II. THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS CRITICISMS OF ARTICLE III 
Richard Henry Lee, a sitting Continental Congressman from Virginia who had 
previously served as President of the Continental Congress, was among the prominent 
figures that were notably absent from the Convention. Despite his absence, Lee freely 
offered his advice to Virginia delegates such as George Mason before the Convention, 
68
Lee took special note of the fact that the order originally authorizing the 
Convention to revise the Articles of Confederation required that any proposal obtain 
congressional approval before being forwarded on to the states.69 Thus, after the 
draft, and when the measure finally came before Congress, he surprised many by 
offering a number of amendments.70
For this effort, Lee was politically pilloried. His motion to consider amendments
including, most notably, a Bill of Rights was rejected without debate.71 Matters further 
deteriorated after Lee, along with future Anti-Federalist apologist Melancton Smith, 
only nine states ratify the document instead of the unanimity required under the Articles 
of Confederation.72 This move was also swiftly rejected. 
Following this episode, and before returning from New York to Virginia, Lee met 
with Melancton Smith and John Lamb.73 This meeting, where these men likely discussed 
their strategy for securing amendments to the proposed Constitution, portended a 
growing movement of Americans who were skeptical of the plan. Later, in December 
1787, Lee would publish a lengthy letter outlining his opposition to the Constitution,74
only to receive further public (and personal) criticism from Federalists like Oliver 
68. J. KENT MCGAUGHY, RICHARD HENRY LEE OF VIRGINIA: A PORTRAIT OF AN AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY 147 58 (2004). 
69. Id. at 191. 
70. See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337 39 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 1 DHRC]. 
 71. MCGAUGHY, supra note 68, at 191. 
72. Id.
73. Id.
 74. 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 61 64, 208 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 8 DHRC]. 
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Ellsworth. Melancton Smith would also soon take up the Anti-Federalist cause in New 
York, helping author at least one (and perhaps both) of what were arguably the most 
sophisticated Anti-Federalist tracts written during the ratification period: Brutus and 
Federal Farmer.75
The Anti-
quintessential and foundational Anti-Federalist objection is worth underscoring at the 
outset. ement quoted above, the Anti-Federalists 
especially feared that the Constitution was calculated to absorb the states into a single 
national government. As Federal Farmer I published October 8, 1787 told the tale: 
the men who had originally pressed for the 
idea of destroying . . . the state government[s], and forming one consolidated system, 
76 Thus, these men had attempted to fool the states into 
77
 . . [from] being 
thirteen republics, under a federal head . . 78
the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation . . . it approaches so near 
to it, tha 79 Numerous other 
Anti-Federalists raised similar concerns.80
-Federalists
that carried well into the state ratifying conventions and beyond. In this way, the Anti-
Federalists plainly shared some common ground with the so-called Dickinson Federalists 
at the Constitutional Convention like Mason and Ellsworth.  
On that note, it should not surprise the reader to learn that El
contributions to the ratification debates include multiple statements demonstrating his 
report (jointly authored by Sherman) that, under the new plan, 
81 (2) his suggestion in the pseudonymously 
75. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at xi xxxii 
(discussing the authorship of Brutus and Federal Farmer). 
76. Federal Farmer I, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note
7, at 23. 
77. Id. at 19, 23. 
78. Id. at 22. 
79. Brutus I, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 169. 
80. See, e.g., Cato III (Sept. 26, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 109 13 (Herbert J. Storing 
& Murray Dry eds., 1981) (arguing that a consolidated government would run afoul of Montesquieu s
admonition against large republics); Centinel II (Oct. 24, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 147 
(Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981) (predicting that Congress would before long swallow up the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial powers of the several States ); The Address and Reasons of the 
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania To Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), in 3 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 155 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981) (noting that two co-ordinate 
sovereignties would be a solecism in politics  and that the inevitable conflict between state and national 
governments will result in the absolute destruction of state governments . . . [because they] are divested of 
every means of defence ).
 81. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 352 (John P. Kaminski et 
al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 3 DHRC]. 
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published Landholder IV that there was no need to fear consolidation or really any
change to the situation of the states because their power to choose Senators 
82 and (3) his passing suggestion 
in Landholder VI that, except where the United States Supreme Court had original 
e state courts and those 
83 Because the immediate question 
facing the nation had become whether to ratify the Constitution as proposed, however, 
Ellsworth also frequently took up the mantle of defending a robust and unified national 
government.84 Thus, despite the affinities between Anti-Federalists and pro-state power 
Federalists, this natural alliance would sit largely unrealized for the time being. 
Turning to the specific criticisms of Article III put forward by Anti-Federalists, 
many publications in the latter months of 1787 contained some analysis of the judiciary. 
guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases, a provision to ensure that juries in criminal cases 
the defendant was domiciled, and certain limitations on diversity and alienage 
jurisdiction so as to prevent defendants from being hauled into a court hundreds of miles 
away from home.85 Other Anti-Federalists struck similar chords. Cincinnatus II, for 
example, on November 8, 1787, defended the necessity of the trial by jury in civil cases 
and expressed concern that federal appellate jurisdiction over questions of both law and 
fact would subvert jury trials completely.86 Objections to the 
Constitution, published in various places in November 1787, he suggested that the 
federal judiciary might be responsible for bringing about the feared consolidation, which 
would in turn encourage the oppression of the poor: 
The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended as to absorb and destroy 
the judiciaries of the several states; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and 
expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England; and 
enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.87
Also, there were numerous other Anti-Federalist publications in this time period 
containing partially developed criticisms of Article III, including Centinel II (published 
October 24, 1787),88 The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
(published December 16, 1787),89 and Federal Farmer XV (published January 16, 
82. Id. at 479 80 (claiming that no alteration in the state governments is even proposed, but they are to 
remain identically the same as they now are ). 
83. Id. at 490. 
84. See, e.g., Landholder II, in 3 DHRC, supra note 81, at 463 (noting that [a] government capable of 
controlling the whole . . . is one of the prerequisites for national liberty ); Ellsworth speech at Connecticut 
Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra note 81, at 548 54 (emphasizing the necessity of judicial review 
to keep the states [from] go[ing] beyond their limits ). 
85. 1 DHRC, supra note 70, at 337 39. 
86. Cincinnatus II (Nov. 8, 1787), in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 11 12 (Herbert J. Storing & 
Murray Dry eds., 1981). 
87. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 13 (John P. Kaminski 
et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 2 DHRC]. 
88. Id. at 147 49. 
89. 3 DHRC, supra note 81, at 159 61. 
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1788).90
Beginning in late-January 1788, however, the upward trajectory of Anti-Federalist 
commentary about the federal judiciary reached its zenith in a series of essays penned by 
Brutus. Instead of devoting only a few scattered comments to the topic as did most other 
Anti-Federalist authors, Brutus set aside five consecutive letters presenting a 
From the outset, Brutus was not shy about his unique ambition in these letters, 
suggest
91
Constitution grants the federal judiciary far too long a leash, and that the Supreme 
Brutus XI, the first letter examining the judiciary, 
provides a concise opening formulation of this claim, stating that through these 
letters
92 In this opening letter, Brutus 
also provides a roadmap of his argument. First, he plans to convince his readers of the 
proposed Constitution.93 And, second, Brutus hopes to show how this power will be 
inevitably abused at the expense of the states.94
 Federal judges, 
he legislature, both with 
95 What is more, beyond their tenure and salary 
protections, Brutus notes how these judges might resist any external oversight through 
their power to flexibly interpret the Constitution. In one striking passage, Brutus states 
established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and 
96
meaning to the various parts [of the Constitution], as will . . . most effectually promote 
the ends the constitution had in view . . . 97 Still later, Brutus argues that other parts of 
90. 2 DHRC, supra note 87, at 315 23. 
91. See Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, 
at 233. 
92. Id. at 235. 
93. Id. at 234. 
94. Id. at 234, 237 39. 
95. Id. at 234. 
96. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 
236. 
97. Id. at 238. Brutus earlier places this ends-based  method of equitable interpretation in the context of a 
broader theory of constitutional interpretation. [C]ourts are to give such meaning to the constitution as 
comports best with the common, and generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed, 
regarding their ordinary and popular use, rather than their grammatical propriety,  Brutus states. He continues: 
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the Constitution invite this open-
and indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which require long 
98
All of this is especially problematic, Brutus continues, because the Supreme Court 
will have the final say as to the meaning of the Constitution. Anticipating Chief Justice 
Marbury v. Madison,99 Brutus contends that, because Article III, 
section 2 explicitly extends the judicial power to
and
construction of the constitution . . . 100
in the constitution, 
. . . 101 Nor can Congress be permitted to disagree with the federal judiciary, Brutus 
ture must be controuled by the constitution, and not the constitution 
102
Expanding on this point in Brutus XV, the final letter on the judiciary, Brutus notes 
how even the people themselves are unable to check the Supreme Court under the 
proposed Constitution: 
Had the construction of the constitution been left with the legislature, they would have 
explained it at their peril; if they exceed their powers, or sought to find in the constitution, 
more than was expressed in the letter, the people from whom they derived their power 
could remove them, and do themselves right . . . . [B]ut when this power is lodged in the 
hands of men independent of the people . . . no way is left to controul them but with a high 
hand and an outstretched arm.103
Here, Brutus implies that a significant flaw exists in the mixed brand of federalism 
adopted by the Constitutional Convention. 
encroachme
themselves! Thus, the very motivating principle of the Virginia Plan that military 
conflicts between state and federal governments must be avoided at all costs is again 
put at risk. If the people cannot realistically expect to hold their governors accountable 
[w]here words are dubious, they will be explained by context . . . [and] [t]he end of the clause will be attended 
to, and the words will be understood as to bear no meaning or a very absurd one. Id. at 235 36. 
98. Id. at 237. 
 99. There, Chief Justice Marshall states: 
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution. Could 
it be the intention of those who gave this power to say that, in using it, the Constitution should not 
be looked into? That a case arising under the Constitution should be decided without examining the 
instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained. 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 79 (1803). 
100. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 
235. 
101. Id. at 236 
102. Id. at 236 37.  
103. Id. at 262. Brutus  use of the phrase a high hand and an outstretched arm  is a reference to the Old 
Testament God s characterization of his deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 4:34, 
5:15, 7:19, 11:2. 
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for what the people judge to be flawed interpretations of the Constitution, they will have 
no choice but to turn back to military solutions to address their grievances. This line of 
thought is also likely behind an earlier passage in Brutus XV, which echoes the Lockean 
104
There is no power above [the judiciary], to controul any of their decisions. There is no 
authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the 
legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every 
power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves 
independent of heaven itself.105
 Having established the 
unique power and position of the federal courts, Brutus turns again to the theme of 
consolidation, offering numerous reasons in Brutus XI and XII 
expansive power spells doom for the states. 
specific clauses of the Constitution such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, the 
by way of contending that 
all of these will eventually be marshaled against the states.106
argument on this point concerns his analysis of the human desire for power.  
claims.107 Accordingly, unless they are somehow checked, such men will only expand 
their own influence. ed in the 
judges, will be in proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they 
108
constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their 
109 As a result, even if this development is 
gradual, bit-by- states] become so 
110
 XI and XII and before he 
returns to the topic of judicial power in Brutus XV, in letters XIII and XIV Brutus focuses 
on two other important aspects of Article III: state sovereign immunity and the right to 
trial by jury. 
e most 
111
 104. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 379 80 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960). 
105. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 
258. 
106. Id. at 241 45. 
107. Id. at 238. 
108. Id.
109. Id. Brutus also argues that if the Constitution is to be interpreted in accordance with its ends and spirit, 
its spirit is to subvert and abolish all the powers of the state government, and to embrace every object to which 
any government extends. Id. at 243.  
110. Brutus XI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 
245. 
111. Id. at 247. 
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112 Also, given that many states owed money to individuals after the 
litigation against states that the solvency of state budgets would be jeopardized.113
Concerning the right to trial by jury, in letter XIV Brutus sounds a common Anti-
in all cases both criminal and civil. Yet, unlike most Anti-Federalists touching on the 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as 
114
fact would 
undermine the entire institution of the jury. If an appellate judge can reject a lower court 
hollow. Alternatively, if Congress were to require that appellate courts call a second jury 
when reviewing lower court findings of fact, this would significantly incentivize 
appeals  . 115 Under such a 
system, litigants would have to pay an attorney throughout the duration of yet another 
116 Litigants would have to meet new evidence if introduced and 
would be held under the shadow of litigation for a longer period of time.117 Finally, 
Brutus observes that appellate courts will almost always be located further away from the 
homes of the witnesses and parties involved than trial courts.118 And this will inevitably 
still be the case (although to a lesser degree), even if Congress requires appellate judges 
to ride circuit.119 Thus, because fewer witnesses will be able to make the trip to the 
appellate court, the second jury runs the risk of being deprived of the benefits of live 
testimony and cross-examination. He states: 
It is of great importance in the distribution of justice that witnesses should be examined 
face to face, that the parties should have the fairest opportunity of cross examining them in 
order to bring out the whole truth; there is something in the manner in which a witness 
delivers his testimony which cannot be committed to paper, and which yet very frequently 
gives a complexion to his evidence, very different from what it would bear if committed to 
112. Id.
113. Id. at 247 49. 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis mine). 
115. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 253. It is 
worth noting here, however, that many state judicial systems at the time would have permitted something like a 
second trial upon appeal. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 27 29 (discussing how some of the American colonies, 
and especially those in New England, essentially permitted a new trial on appeal throughout much of the 18th 
Century); RITZ, supra note 11, at 6, 27 (discussing how appeals involving a new trial and jury were not unusual 
in post-revolutionary state judicial systems). 
116. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 254 (opining 
that the costs in the supreme general court will exceed [every] court[]; the officers . . . will be more dignified 
. . . , the lawyers of the most ability will practice in them, and the trouble and expense of attending them will be 
greater ). 
117. Id. at 251. 
118. Id. at 253. 
119. Id.
20
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writing . . . .120
Adding all of this together, Br
121 The fact that 
to little short of a denial of justice to the poor and midling class of people who in every 
122
poorer and midling class of citizens will be under necessity of submitting to the demands 
of the rich and the lordly, in cases that will come under the cognizance of this 123
What solution does Brutus offer for these problems? His answer here is 
particularly important, for it helps clarify the Dickinson-like brand of federalism he 
supports. Beyond arguing that federal appellate courts should be permitted to review 
ht . . . 
124 By allowing state courts 
good old way of administering justice, would bring justice to ever
125 Further, this approach would avoid, as 
much as possible, the consolidating tendency that follows from giving federal judges 
authority to interpret both federal and state law.126 Note, however, that Brutus does not 
assert that state courts should decide all questions with finality, only that they should get 
the first crack. 
writs of error were allowed from the state courts to the supreme court of the union . . . on 
all cases in which the laws of the union are concerned, and perhaps to all cases in which 
127
federal inferior courts, but the United States Supreme Court would have ample authority 
to review any questions of federal law that arose in cases at the state level.  
Almost in the same breath that he proposes this solution, however, Brutus seems to 
grant that the ship of federal inferior courts may have already set sail. 
ss may 
seem fit to appoint . . . . 128 And if Congress has the power to create inferior courts, it is 
safe to assume that this power will be exercised. 
inferior courts is not that far from that of other Anti-Federalists like Federal Farmer
who took it as a given that the proposed national government would include inferior 
120. Id. at 254. 
121. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 254. 
122. Id.
123. Id. at 253. 
124. Id. at 256. 
125. Id.
126. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 245 ( It is 
obvious that these courts will have authority to decide upon the validity of the laws of any of the states, in all 
cases that come before them . . . . [Thus,] it is easy to see that in proportion as the general government acquires 
power and jurisdiction [the states will] lose [their] rights . . . ). 
127. Id. at 256 
128. Id.
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courts but presumably hoped to limit  power and jurisdiction.129
Federalist Nos. 78–83. In that regard, it is worth highlighting that Brutus XI through 
Brutus XV were published between January 31, 1788 and March 20, 1788.130 Federalist 
Nos. 74–83, on the other hand, appeared in book form more than two months later on 
May 28, 1788.131 Also, this collection was issued almost two months after Federalist 
No. 73 (published April 2, 1788), a break that was by far the longest between any two 
editions of the Federalist Papers.132 And this all occurred against the backdrop of New 
h took place in late April 1788, and the state ratifying 
convention which began in June 1788. This suggests, at the very least, that the 
III. THE FEDERALISTS REJOINDER AND THE STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS
Federalist No. 78 arguably occupies a position behind only Federalist Nos. 10 and 
51 among the most widely read of the Federalist Papers. Yet despite its theoretical 
power and historical importance, this letter, and the related installments that follow, are 
rarely considered in relation to Brutus.133 This is unfortunate because an appreciation of 
 interlocutor as well as the broader Anti-Federalist-dominated 
political climate in New York sheds helpful light on a number of H
not least of which is his particularly sunny portrayal of the unlikelihood of judicial 
overreach. 
134 arguments track 
that the federal judges under the proposed system are too independent, judicial review 
places the Supreme Court above Congress and the people, that this will result in the 
subvert the right to trial by jury. 
In Federalist No. 78
135 that judicial independence is necessary to protect the states from 
Congressional overreach,136 and that the proposed Constitution does not make the 
129. Federal Farmer XV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra
note 7, at 130 31. 
130. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 422. 
131. Id. at 423. 
132. Id. at 420 23. 
133. But see, e.g., Treanor, supra note 14; Shlomo Slonim, Federalist No. 78 and Brutus’ Neglected Thesis 
on Judicial Supremacy, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 7 31 (2006). 
 134. As I develop below, it seems to me that Federalist Nos. 78–83 reveal especially Hamilton’s position as 
to the judiciary, not necessarily Madison s (or Jay s for that matter). For this reason, I refer to Hamilton instead 
of Publius  throughout this section, although I otherwise remain agnostic about whether it is productive to 
treat Publius as expressing a consistent position throughout the Federalist Papers. For extended treatments of 
the split-personality  thesis, compare George W. Carey, Publius—A Split Personality?, 46 REV. POL. 5 22
(1984), with Thomas Mason, The Federalist—A Split Personality, 57 AM. HIST. REV. 625 43, and GOTTFRIED 
DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT (1960), and Douglass Adair, 
The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, 1 WM. & MARY Q. 97 122 (1944). 
 135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 03 (Alexander Hamilton). 
136. Id. at 403. 
22
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the people’s supremacy.137 Later, in Federalist Nos. 80 and 
81, Hamilton champions judicial review as a 
138 and as decidedly better than the British model of legislative 
supremacy, which Brutus cites,139 because it respects the separation of powers.140
Finally, in Federalist Nos. 81 and 83,
right to trial by jury.141
of the Anti-Federalists, however, one must start not only with Brutus, but as Hamilton 
himself counsels at the very beginning of his discussion of the courts142 also with 
Federalist Nos. 15–22, the earlier installments of the Federalist Papers 
insuf
were authored by Hamilton).143 As referenced in the discussion in Part I of the various 
conceptions of federalism presented at the Constitutional Convention,144 Federalist Nos. 
15 and 16 
conflicts between the two completely-formed, parallel levels of government national 
and state by allowing the federal government to operate directly on individual 
citizens.145
comments about the judiciary’s role in this plan. For what arm of government actually 
applies the law to individuals but the judiciary? As Hamilton himself states: 
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be 
attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. . . . 
This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways; by the agency of the 
courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, 
or by the COERCION of arms.146
Hamilton it is also one of the most important and this is so for at least two reasons. 
First, as discussed previously, the judiciary now filled the critical role of preventing state 
overreach, functioning as the lynchpin of the whole system, which Madison had 
137. Id. at 404. 
138. Id. at 418. 
139. Brutus XV, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 
257 61. 
 140. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 418 19 (Alexander Hamilton). 
141. Id. at 423 25, 430 42. 
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the utility and necessity of a 
federal judicature have been clearly pointed out  in the earlier letters that unfold[ed] the defects of the existing 
confederation ). 
 143. For the initial roadmap of the argument of the Federalist Papers, see Federalist 1, in THE FEDERALIST
4 (noting that after discussing [t]he utility of the UNION  Publius will discuss [t]he insufficiency of the 
present confederation to preserve that Union ). For confirmation that Federalist Nos. 15–22 constitute this 
section, see also Federalist 15, in THE FEDERALIST 68; Federalist 23, in THE FEDERALIST 112. 
144. See supra notes 36 55 and accompanying text.
 145. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15 16, at 72 75, 77 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (insisting that we must extend 
the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens  in order to avoid applying the COERCION of arms
to the states). 
146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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originally hoped to assign to Congress. But, second, as a rather Hobbesian-sounding 
Hamilton emphasizes in these earlier letters, there is a close connection between the 
power to punish citizens and the creation of a government worthy of respect. In 
Federalist 17, Hamil
147 Later, while summarizing his critique of the Articles of 
Confederation, Hamilton states: 
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly this, that if it be 
possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common 
concerns, and preserving the general tranquility . . . [t]he majesty of the national authority 
must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the 
union, like that of each state, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and 
fears of individuals; and to attract to its support, those passions, which have the strongest 
influence on the human heart.148
nce 
 In light of these comments, it should come as no surprise that, 
shortly after this, in a seldom referenced portion of Federalist No. 22, Hamilton goes so 
ts of the 
149
treatment of federal inferior courts in Federalist Nos. 81 and 82, a discussion which 
tate courts in the 
 Following from the comments above as well as what has 
federal government, one would expect Hamilton to return immediately to the claim that a 
well-developed system of federal inferior courts is necessary for the federal government 
to gain the support of the people.  
But Hamilton is more creative and politically savvy than that. After conceding that 
that Congress could (at least arguably) assign such a role to state courts under the 
Constitution, Hamilton goes on to tactfully mention several reasons why state courts, in 
fact, might not be trusted to apply federal law after all.150 These reasons include state 
inconvenience of a system in which appeals are the norm an inconvenience which 
would be all the more necessary for accomplishing uniformity if there were no inferior 
federal courts.151
constituting inferior courts should exist in the full extent in which it is seen in the 
147. Id. at 82. 
148. Id. at 78. 
149. Id. at 110. 
150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton). 
151. Id. (stating that if there was a necessity for confiding to [state courts] the original cognizance of causes 
arising under [federal] law[], there would be a correspondent necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide 
as possible ) (emphasis mine). 
24
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proposed constituti
district courts possessing original jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law.152
another unexpected turn in Federalist No. 82, where he goes so far as to recommend that 
state courts be allowed to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all federal claims as long 
as Congress has not explicitly directed to the contrary.153 In other words, like Brutus, 
Hamilton here expresses a willingness to allow state courts to hear (at least initially) a 
great number of cases involving federal law. At first blush, this seems to stand in blatant 
opposition to the common Federalist goal of excluding state agency in the federal 
between the two parallel governmental systems. Granted, as Hamilton subsequently 
suggests, many Federalists likely assumed that the states would have concurrent 
jurisdiction over at least some federal causes of action considering that the prevailing 
law-of-nations paradigm permitted the courts of one nation to apply the laws of another 
on some occasions.154 But this puzzling aspect of Federalist No. 82 is only further 
problematized
155 Hamilton responds in the affirmative, declarin
attending [this arrangement] . . 156 Hamilton continues: 
[Allowing federal inferior courts to hear appeals from state courts] would diminish the 
motives to the multiplication of federal courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated 
to contract the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The state tribunals may then be 
left with a more entire charge of federal causes; and appeals in most cases in which they 
may be deemed proper, instead of being carried to the supreme court, may be made to lie 
from the state courts, to district courts of the union.157
So, here, we have the allegedly nationalist Hamilton championing a solution that 
would minimize the necessity of setting up federal courts and give state courts a broader 
role in interpreting federal law. Had Hamilton somehow been converted to the cause of 
encouraging state agency in the federal government in order to protect the states? Or, is 
152. Id. at 421 23. 
153. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) ( I am even of opinion, that in every case in 
which they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take 
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. ). 
 154. For a comprehensive treatment of this aspect of the law of nations framework, see generally Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949 (2006). In this regard, as 
Hamilton goes on to explain, if Congress were to disallow state courts from hearing all claims arising under 
federal law, this would have given foreign courts more power than state courts. In Hamilton s own words: 
The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil 
cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes 
of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than 
of New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our courts. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 427 28 (Alexander Hamilton). A key difference between a court of Japan applying 
federal law and a court of New York, however, was obviously that one of these courts sits within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States and the other does not.  
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other grounds. A hint toward a key difference between Hamilton
the judiciary appears at the beginning of Federalist No. 82, where Hamilton states that 
can mature and perfect so compound a system, liquidate the meaning of all 
the 159
overnments and the national 
governments . . 160 Hamilton repeats this language a final 
161 Here, however, Hamilton is more 
suggestive about the consequences of this characterization, stating that it follows that 
 . . be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws 
will be controlled by the Supreme Court, a bod
162
The nationalist Hamilton returns! 
state-friendly flourishes to reflect upon the actual system he proposes, it becomes clear 
that, in permitting appeals from state courts to lower federal courts, Hamilton reduces 
state courts to a station below, not beside, inferior federal courts. The following chart 
illustrates this difference between Brutus and Hamilton:163
158. See Campbell, supra note 16, at 1118 19, 1129 (arguing that, in the similar context of commandeering 
state officers for collecting federal taxes, Hamilton adopted a more state agency-friendly rhetorical strategy in 
Federalist 36 than he had in earlier debates about the 1783 Compromise ). 
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton). 
160. Id. at 428. 
161. Id.
162. Id.
 163. I use the terms superior  and inferior  in the chart below (as opposed to district, appellate, or 
supreme) because most state judiciaries in 1789 operated in a different manner than modern systems. See RITZ,
supra note 11, at 27 52; but see GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 468 (remarking that no belief was more ingrained in 
this country than that courts were properly to be ordered in terms of inferior and superior jurisdiction ). With 
the exception of Virginia, no state at the time had yet instituted intermediate appellate courts, nor were judicial 
opinions published in reports. RITZ, supra note 11, at 48. Also, as was previously noted, state superior courts 
sometimes conducted new trials on appeal. Id. at 38 41. Moreover, despite the fact that multiple levels of 
courts were common in state systems at the time, a shared corps of judges  would generally staff the courts in 
such a way that a given judge could sit at any level on the hierarchy. Id. at 6. 
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Hamilton’s Judiciary                                               Brutus’ Judiciary
Instead of granting states a degree of agency in the federal government in order to 
defend their existence (like Brutus), 
regularly interpret federal law is not an unimportant concession. But notice that, under 
presumably have two entry points into the system either
at the state or federal trial court level and therefore have some disincentive toward 
starting at the lowest rung. 
e he defects of state courts, and his earlier admonition 
about the importance of a federal judiciary that can directly inspire fear and respect, and 
one could easily forgive an Anti- -rights 
bona fides.  
Due to its importance to some Anti-
convincing especially Anti-Federalists in Virginia that perhaps granting state courts a 
role in the federal judicial hierarchy was not such a good idea after all. For example, 
Patrick Henry, who took this stance during the Virginia ratification convention in late-
June of 1788, argued that vesting the authority to interpret federal law in state courts 
164
Virginia Anti-Federalists like future Senator William Grayson also fell in line with this 
view.165 t least partially obstructionist, however, is 
indicated by the Virginia Anti-
prohibited from creating federal inferior courts thus leaving the U.S. Supreme Court as 
the only body that would hear cases arising under federal law.166
 164. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1419 (John P. Kaminski 
et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter 10 DHRC]. 
165. Id. at 1445 (suggesting that it would be extremely disgraceful  for [t]he independent Judges of 
Virginia . . . to be subordinate[d] to the Federal Judiciary ). 
166. See id. at 1762 (noting Henry s subsequently expressed commitment to oppose every measure  for 
putting the Constitution into motion unless [Congress] called for a second [constitutional] convention ); see 
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But, to return to Hamilton, if his conception of the judiciary fits poorly with 
Dickinson Federalism, neither does it accord with the course charted by Madison or the 
Virginia Plan, as it flatly violates the principle of keeping federal and state governments 
separate from one another. 
federalism required some point of contact between the national and state governments, 
and the delega  But 
rather than minimizing the overlap between state and federal judiciaries, Hamilton here 
maximizes it. 
difference if 108 different federal courts (district, circuit, and supreme), all with a large 
number of judges, were empowered to hear appeals from the state level instead of a 
single court of nine justices with an appellate caseload limited by the certiorari 
process.167 In that regard, if one were tasked with selecting the version of federalism 
unified
national system.168
a different series of pseudonymously published articles appearing more than ten years 
later.
just prior to the Anti- -inspired Judiciary Act of 1801 
(which would have created twenty-three additional inferior federal judicial posts169),
Hamilton had the opportunity to comment on the framework adopted by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 in a series of articles titled the 170 There, in the sixth 
installment of the series, Hamilton flatly states that the original Judiciary Act was 
171 And while 
-riding requirement, 
Hamilton subsequently raises a number of 
hear federal claims in the first instance, subject only to Supreme Court appellate 
review.172 that state courts will have local bias, 
that a system in which appeals are the norm encourages unnecessary expense and delay, 
also id. at 1555 (listing, among the proposed amendments that Virginia attached to its ratification, that the 
judiciary consist only of one Supreme Court  and such Courts of Admiralty as Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish ). 
167. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 41, 43 (noting that, as of September 30, 2013, there were ninety-
four district courts with 677 authorized district judgeships and 346 senior district judges, and thirteen circuit 
courts with 179 authorized judgeships and eighty-nine senior circuit court judges). 
 168. As additional support for this portrayal of Hamilton, consider his discussion in Federalist 17 comparing 
the conflict between state and federal governments to the historical conflicts in European feudal systems. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 82 84 (Alexander Hamilton). There, if one follows the analogy, Hamilton s suggestion 
is that, just as either the monarch or the aristocracy eventually supplanted the other in their conflicts over the 
affections of the people, either the federal or state governments would ultimately come to dominate the other 
under the American Constitution. Id.  
 169. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 8 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 278 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 
1904).  
 170. The long title for the series is The Examination of Jefferson s Message to Congress of December, 7 
1801. Id. at 246.  
171. Id. at 278. 
172. Id. at 278, 280.
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and that the federal government should have its own courts to enforce its own laws are
familiar, with the exception that Hamilton seems to have changed his mind about 
whether states can constitutionally be made to perform the role of interpreting federal 
law.173
the broad use of state courts to interpret federal law was never ideal.  
Though Hamilton was the most prominent Federalist to provide a lengthy defense 
of Article III, other Federalists also addressed the topic. One particularly relevant, albeit 
brief, contribution was already mentioned that of Oliver Ellsworth. Recall that 
Ellsworth held the Federalist party-line in noting the importance of establishing federal 
inferior courts to interpret federal law,174 but also suggested that state courts might hear 
175 Because Connecticut was one of the first states 
to ratify the Constitution, howev -developed comments came 
never in doubt.176
speech he gave at the Virginia ratifying convention on June 20, 1788. There, in 
defending federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law, Madison 
correspond wit 177 Later, 
Madison provides a more thoroughgoing statement in support of federal judicial power 
(albeit in the immediate context of the interpretation of treaties), remarking that 
 affecting the interest of the United States, ought to be determined by 
178 Madison does 
of Congress to vest [judicial] power in the State Courts . . . when they find the tribunals 
179 But later statements in the diversity 
jurisdiction context again make it seem like state courts will be limited to hearing 
controversies between citizens of the same state involving only state law.180 Similar to 
Hamilton, then, Madison never provides theoretical resources for why one would want to 
give state courts federal judicial power and, in fact, the reader is left with the 
impression that the opposite strategy would be more advisable. Unlike Hamilton, 
however, Madison also never gives any indication that inferior federal courts might hear 
appeals from the states. 
appears to chart a course between Hamilton and Brutus. 
Other Federalist presentations at the Virginia ratifying convention sounded similar 
173. Id. at 280 82 ( [I]t is not to be forgotten that the right to employ the agency of the State Courts, for 
executing the laws of the Union, is liable to question, and has, in fact, been seriously questioned ). 
 174. 3 DHRC, supra note 71, at 484 (noting that [a] legislative power without a judicial and executive 
under their own control is in the nature of things a nullity ). 
175. Id. at 490 (suggesting that all the cases, except the few in which [the Supreme Court] has original and 
not appellate jurisdiction, may in the first instance be had in state courts . . ). 
176. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 299 300, 337 39. 
 177. 1 DHRC, supra note 70, at 1413. 
178. Id. at 1414. 
179. Id. at 1417. 
180. Id. at 1418. 
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notes. Like Madison, John Marshall expressed incredulity over the Virginia Anti-
not create inferior federal courts or that 
 Concerning the 
[that it allows Congress to establish inferior courts] . . . it seems necessary to the 
181
remarked: 
Is it not necessary that the Federal Courts should have cognizance of cases arising under 
the Constitution, and the laws of the United States? What is the service or purpose of a 
Judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable orderly manner, without shedding blood, 
or creating a contest, or availing yourselves of force? If this be the case, where can its 
jurisdiction be more necessary than here?182
Edmund Pendleton had a similar take, clearly supporting both the creation of 
183 Edmund 
Randolph, who eventually sided with the Federalists, also threw his weight behind these 
points.184
Ultimately, then, an important consensus emerges from the Federalist side 
 The Federalists all held that it was necessary for 
Congress to create inferior federal courts with jurisdiction over cases involving federal 
law. To be sure, inner-party disagreements existed on matters like the extent to which 
states might possess concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims, whether this type of 
state court involvement was to be anything more than a short-term strategy to help secure 
would be able to hear appeals from state courts. But the general principle whose origin 
can be traced back to the Virginia Plan that the federal government should possess its 
own fully-developed judiciary was a core doctrine. 
it would be wrong to equate this success with any consensus concerning the judiciary. 
Six of the states that ratified the Constitution simultaneously advanced amendments to 
the document and, of those six, all but one sought some alteration of Article III.185
s, for example, enumerated a whole host of changes to 
Article III including the specification that Congress could only create inferior 
as 
to matters of law only, except in cases of equity, and of admiralty, and maritime 
jurisdiction . . . 186
federal appellate review of fact questions in most cases.187 And, among other things, 
181. Id. at 1431. 
182. 10 DHRC, supra note 164, at 1432. 
183. Id. at 1426 27. 
184. Id. at 1450 52.  
185. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 19. 
 186. 2 DHRC, supra note 87, at 145 46, 160, 377 85. 
187. Id. at 266 76, 290. 
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188 In this way, despite the 
judiciary.
IV. THE JUDICIARY IN THE FIRST CONGRESS
The stage is now set to return to the question posed at the beginning of the article: 
If the Federalists dominated the first Congress and Connecticut Federalist Oliver 
Ellsworth was primarily responsible for drafting the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789, 
why connect the initial implementation of Article III with the Anti-Federalists? Up to 
this point, I have tried to show a fundamental theoretical difference between most Anti-
Federalists and Federalists on how to balance federal and state power. Where the 
Federalists saw the need for a federal supervisory power to prevent state overreach, 
Brutus and other Anti-Federalists wanted the states to have agency in the federal 
government to protect against the opposite danger. The Constitution employed the 
federal judiciary to negotiate conflicts between these parallel levels of government so
the federal judiciary needed to be robust and 
independent. The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, thought they could go a long way 
to preventing a national consolidation if state courts interpreted federal law in the first 
instance. 
This is why it was remarkable that the original federal judiciary was not robust and 
independent. 
granted state courts the primary responsibility for interpreting and applying federal law. 
The ratify-now, amend-later compromises struck during ratification had underscored the 
need to mollify the Anti-Federalists, especially on the subject of the federal judiciary. 
 provided a theoretical foundation for 
the new system. 
legislation that related to the judiciary. The first two, the Bill of Rights and the Judiciary 
Act, were among the ses the Bill of Rights owing most 
efforts of Ellsworth in the Senate.189 The Process Act, on the other hand, was 
supplemental to the Judiciary Act (specifically to §14) and, mostly because of the late 
date on which it was reported and the unexpected degree of controversy it created, its 
final stripped-down form was hastily settled upon.190
Beginning with the Bill of Rights, despite the fact that it arose in a different house 
of Congress than the Judiciary and Process Acts, many scholars have suspected a 
188. Id. at 190 203. 
 189. Of course, both the House and the Senate were involved in all of these enactments, but citations could 
be multiplied supporting Oliver Ellsworth s dominant influence on the Judiciary and Process Acts. Consider, 
for example, James Madison s suggestion (although written later in life) that [i]t may be taken for certain, that 
the bill organizing the judicial department originated in [Ellsworth s] draft, and that it was not materially 
changed in its passage into law. Letter from Madison to Joseph Wood (Feb. 27, 1836). 
190. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 509 10, 535 40.
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probable connection between these measures.191 For one, the timing of their enactments 
alone is suggestive of some association. The Senate put its stamp of approval on the Bill 
of Rights on September 24, 1789, a mere three days after the House agreed to the final 
Senate version of the Judiciary Act.192 Further, as Maeva Marcus and Natalie Wexler 
inking [these bills explicitly] . . . 
[i]t is clear from surviving correspondence that those concerned with procuring greater 
protection for individual rights divided their efforts between the Bill of Rights being 
discussed in the House and the judiciary b 193 One final 
 Gerhard Casper 
that is not counting the Ninth and Tenth Amendments five regard matters mostly 
194 And, if one follows the drafting history of the Bill of Rights, 
one sees that, in addition to the provisions that were eventually adopted, Madison had 
earlier proposed several direct amendments to Article III many of which were 
presumably dropped because their concerns were addressed in the Judiciary Act itself.195
In any event, what is especially relevant for the present inquiry is the degree to 
which several provisions in the Bill of Rights respond to key Anti-Federalists concerns 
about Article III. 
the Constitution involve the courts in some manner. The Fourth Amendment addresses 
searches and seizures and the issuance of warrants, the Fifth Amendment safeguards 
certain key rights of criminal and civil defendants, and the Eighth Amendment addresses 
bail and other punishments.196
however, are the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. 
trials in federal courts would force defendants to travel long distances, thereby 
jeopardizing the local character of juries and the ability of key witnesses to appear in 
person. The Sixth Amendment requires juries in criminal cases to be drawn from the 
district where the crime at issue was committed,197 while the Seventh Amendment 
generally preserves the right to jury trials in civil cases, and prohibits federal courts from 
reviewing questions of fact.198
191. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in ORIGINS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 281 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2002); RITZ, supra
note 11, at 19 21.
192. See Casper, supra note 191, at 281. 
 193. Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 27 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2002). 
194. See Casper, supra note 191, at 281. 
195. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 430 32 (noting that Madison proposed, among other things, to place an 
amount in controversy requirement on the Supreme Court s appellate jurisdiction as well as some further 
clarification regarding whether federal court appellate jurisdiction extended to questions of fact); RITZ, supra
note 11, at 21 (providing a similar account, but also noting the Sixth Amendment s connection to an 
amendment Richard Henry Lee had first proposed to the Judicial Bill).
 196. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VIII. 
 197. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ( In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . ). 
 198. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ( In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
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Turning to the Judiciary Act itself, most of these same concerns are also taken up 
there. In response to the protestations of numerous Anti-Federalists, section 25 of the 
Judiciary Act also limits appellate review of questions of fact.199 Section 29 of the 
boundary line even further than the Sixth Amendment. It required that jurors in cases 
involving an offense punishable by death be selected from the county where the offense 
was committed.200 Additionally, this section also ties jury selection in all other cases to 
state law, which in many cases included other vicinage provisions.201
This brings us to the key question that Oliver Ellsworth and others had to answer 
following the ratification debates: Should Congress set up inferior federal courts with the 
power to hear cases arising under federal law (among other categories of jurisdiction), 
rely on state courts to fill this role, or select some kind of mixed strategy by giving both 
state courts and federal inferior courts concurrent jurisdiction over such claims? As 
discussed above, either the first or third options would have been palatable to the 
Federalists.202 As for the Anti-Federalists, despite the Vir
posturing to the contrary,203
over claims that would otherwise be placed in federal inferior courts was the best 
realistically-possible result.  
Ultimately, although the first Congress voted to establish federal inferior courts, 
primarily the second option above that of relying on the states that Ellsworth 
selected.  
As support for this claim, consider the three levels of courts established by the Act. 
Thirteen federal district courts were created, each with its own judge, and each 
corresponding to state lines in a way that was apparently meant to nod to the importance 
of the states as independent governmental entities.204
 The 
types of cases which these courts could hear was limited to such categories as admiralty 
and maritime disputes, a narrow class of federal crimes with minimal penalties, and suits 
at common law where the United States was the plaintiff.205 Importantly, the Act did not 
provide for diversity or federal question jurisdiction a severe curtailment of the 
permissible boundaries for federal courts under Article III.206
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in 
any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. ). 
 199. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 25 (discussing the implications of § 25 of 
1 Stat. 73 (1789)), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789 1800,
at 85 86 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 4 DHSC]. 
200. Id. at 92. 
201. Id.
202. See supra pp. 29 30. 
203. See supra pp. 27 28 and accompanying notes. 
204. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 2 and § 3, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199,
at 39 42; see also GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 471. 
205. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 9, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 53
54; GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 474 (noting that the District Court s exclusive original jurisdiction over admiralty 
and maritime cases was something that antifederalists generally had conceded was properly federal ).
206. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 25. 
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As to the circuit courts, only three circuits were created, and each was to be staffed 
by one federal district court judge and two supreme court justices riding circuit so as to 
minimize costs.207 This plan required supreme court justices to regularly traverse the 
nation meeting twice annually in two different locations within their respective circuits. 
who claimed that a federal court system would force Americans to travel several hundred 
208 Or as Judiciary Act 
collaborator (and former Constitutional Convention delegate) William Paterson put it in 
language echoing Brutus almost word-for-word: the circuit-riding provision would allow 
209
Plainly, however, the primary way this arrangement brought justice to every 
t by way of circuit-riding, but courtesy of the fact that most cases 
were to be heard in state courts. While the jurisdiction given to circuit courts was more 
expansive than that of the district courts, here again, Ellsworth declined to grant federal 
question jurisdiction to even these courts, leaving the bulk of the work of interpreting 
federal law and the newly-minted Constitution to the states.210 Even the most notable 
grant of additional power here
alienage cases was concurrent with the states and was limited by a (then) sizable 
amount in controversy requirement of $500.211 This limitation served at least two 
purposes. First, it again responded in part to the Anti- indigent 
litigants would be forced to travel great distances to access the courts, as this limitation 
meant that only cases involving large sums of money would require such efforts. Second, 
the amount in controversy requirement also largely avoided the politically sensitive issue 
of pushing alien-debtor cases into federal courts because most such cases would fall 
under the $500 threshold.212
parties appealing a decision of a sta
that only legal questions could be appealed, not questions of fact.213 Next, this section 
allowed review of state courts decisions only where the state court held a treaty provision 
207. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 4 and § 5, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, 
at 44; see also Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (Aug. 4, 1789), in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 495 
(noting that, if one assumes that federal district courts would be created, circuit courts could be added without 
much enhancing the expence  by staffing them with district judges and justices of the Supreme Court). 
 208. TOTH, supra note 47, at 159. Marcus et al. make a similar point, stating that the strategy of holding the 
circuit courts in various locations was meant to respond to critics charging that the effect of the federal 
judiciary would be to drag the accused from his house, friends and connexions, to a distant spot, where he is 
deprived of every advantage of former character, of relations and acquaintance. DHSC, supra note 204, at 
28. 
 209. 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 28 (citing William Paterson s Notes for Remarks on Judiciary Bill, June 
23, 1789 ). Marcus et al. also quote John Jay s statement, made in the opening months of his tenure as the first 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, that the new system of inferior courts [w]as one that would carry Justice 
as it were to every Man s Door. Id.
210. Id. at 59 60. 
211. Id.
 212. TOTH, supra note 47, at 152. 
213. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 25, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at
85 86; TOTH, supra note 47, at 166. 
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or federal statute invalid, or where the state court upheld the validity of state law in the 
face of a constitutional challenge or claim or federal preemption.214 This means that any 
state court decisions over-applying federal law were completely insulated from Supreme 
Court review.  
Taken together, the parallels between these critical sections of the Judiciary Act 
and Brutus XIV are remarkable. Recall again that, although Brutus believed his concerns 
about indigent litigants and federal overreach could be (at least partially) addressed by 
need for the United States Supreme Court to hear appeals concerning questions of 
law.215 This is exactly the approach that Ellsworth and the rest of Congress adopted. 
Toth also sees the connection here, saying: 
In Section 25, Ellsworth pursued the course of action that Brutus had recommended. The 
Connecticut Federalist accepted the Anti-
to try cases based on federal statutory or constitutional claims, subject to oversight by the 
Supreme Court struck the right balance. . . 
 It encountered no 
objection in either the Senate or the House.216
In short, the first Congress went to great lengths to assuage the concerns about federal 
judicial overreach that the Anti-
There is still one objection that needs to be addressed, however. That is, if the first 
Congress really did respond to most of the Anti-
judiciary, then why did several Anti-Federalists in Congress vote against the Judiciary 
Act in its final form? As 
influential decision at the Virginia state ratifying convention to oppose the creation of 
federal inferior courts, a position that was folded into his broader political strategy of 
attempting to undermine the new Constitution.217 Add to this the fact that several of the 
state ratifying conventions had concluded with a call for amendments preventing the 
creation of such courts,218 and it is no surprise that several (though not all219) Anti-
Federalists adopted this more radical position at the first Congress. There were also other 
214. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 25, in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at
85 86 (permitting review of state court final judgment[s] or decrees . . . where is drawn in question the 
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against 
their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under the 
State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the 
decision is in favor of their validity . . ). 
215. See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 7, at 
256. 
216. See TOTH, supra note 47, at 170. 
217. See supra pp. 27 28 and accompanying notes; see also GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 419, 442, 462, 494, 
503, 507 (describing various Anti-Federalist votes against the Judiciary Act as well as Patrick Henry s attempts 
to bring about Madison s political downfall ); Campbell, supra note 16, at 1148 53 (noting that although the 
Anti-Federalists in the first Congress generally opposed the creation of inferior federal courts, they did not 
share Henry s concern with state courts hearing federal claims). 
218. See supra pp. 29 31. 
 219. Elbridge Gerry, for example, was a prominent Anti-Federalist who argued in favor of the creation of 
inferior federal courts. See Brogdon, supra note 3, at 225 27 (discussing the debate about inferior federal 
courts in the House of Representatives). 
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reasons that Anti-Federalists might have voted against the bill, such as the federal 
ovelty, its expense, or because they were unsatisfied that it had done 
enough to address the new c 220 But, viewed in 
context, the decision Anti-Federalists in the first Congress made to outflank the 
arguments of Brutus (and Federal Farmer) says more about the realities of political 
negotiation and how public sentiment had shifted in the Anti-
The final piece of legislation at the first Congress implementing Article III was the 
Process Act of 1789, which, as mentioned above, was meant to regulate the procedures 
and forms of action to be used in federal courts.221 The same Senate committee that 
drafted the Judiciary Act was also responsible for the Process Act.222 Yet this Act was 
not destined to share the same smooth path through Congress. In crafting the Process 
Act, Ellsworth and company had attempted the herculean task of sorting through the 
diverse state procedural approaches to arrive at a uniform federal system.223 This proved 
overly ambitious for at least two reasons. First, considering the attachment various 
-old professional 
224
good faith overtures across the political aisle, the Anti-Federalists were relentless in 
pursuing a sustained offensive . . . against a and they saw 
this as yet another opportunity to resist federal control.225
reported near the end of the session, it was met with a wave of opposition that sunk the 
ship of federal procedural uniformity, at least for the time being. The result, then, was 
that even in the limited sphere of jurisdiction they had been given, federal courts would 
have to use state procedures and, for cases raising common law questions, state causes of 
action.226 Numerous scholars recognize this as a victory for the Anti-Federalists.227 As 
 220. Although a Federalist, consider William Maclay s characteristically provocative summary of his 
objection to the bill: 
I opposed this bill from the beginning. It certainly is a vile law system, calculated for expense and 
with a design to draw by degrees all law business into the Federal courts. The Constitution is meant 
to swallow all the State Constitutions by degrees, and thus to swallow, by degrees, all the State 
judiciaries. 
See, e.g., JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA, 1789 1791, at 114 
(Edgar Stanton Maclay ed., 1890). 
221. See An Act to Regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States (discussing 1 Stat. 93 (1789) 
(repealed 1792)), in 4 DHSC, supra note 199, at 114 15. 
222. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 509. 
223. Id. at 512, 514. 
224. Id. at 511. 
225. Id. at 510. 
226. See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 17, at 629. Bellia and Clark s article raises yet another reason why 
the Anti-Federalists might not have been given the credit they are due for the original federal judiciary over the 
years. Namely, for a long time, scholars have misunderstood the nature of the federal common law, believing 
that federal courts could themselves make up federal causes of action based on ambient of general law  as 
suggested in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). This was not the case. Instead, because of the 
Process Acts, federal courts were bound to use state law forms of proceeding when hearing cases based on the 
common law. Id. at 611 13. 
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Anthony Bellia, Jr. and Bradford Clark put the point (in relation to both the 1789 and 
1792 Acts): 
In important ways, the Process Acts were a victory for anti-Federalists against proponents 
of centralized federal judicial power. The Acts denied federal courts the power to devise a 
uniform system of federal causes of action that potentially could have undermined state 
interests. The Acts also prevented the development of two fundamentally different 
remedial systems in the same state, thereby sparing litigants and lawyers the need to learn a 
new system.228
Accordingly, even on this occasion when Ellsworth thought it necessary to side 
with federal uniformity, the first Congress landed on the other side. 
CONCLUSION
Having now canvassed four key moments in the establishment of the United States 
judiciary the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, the state ratifying 
conventions, and the first Congress the payoff should be clear: it was not primarily the 
Anti-  Taken together, the Bill of Rights, the Judiciary Act, and the Process 
Act demonstrate how the first Congress responded to the Anti-
carefully circumscribing the jurisdiction of the federal courts, using state courts to check 
the expansion of federal power, increasing the connection between the execution of 
federal law and local juries, and tying federal forms of action and procedures to the 
states.
Virginia Plan by 
allowing state courts to execute and interpret the bulk of federal law. And this decision is 
all the more striking once one recalls that the key component of Madisonian 
federalism t against state 
intransigency was now housed in the judicial branch. 
The first implementation of Article III thus represents the Anti-
unequivocal political victory. Even if their influence on the federal judiciary was 
eventually outlasted, their success in establishing this point of departure significantly 
turning point in the evolution of the American political experiment. There is also a 
certain irony to the Anti-  By limiting the creation and jurisdiction of 
 The original 
federal judiciary was the least dangerous branch at least for a while. 
227. See, e.g., id. at 647; 4 DHSC, supra note 204, at 108 ( [A]s with the Judiciary Act, those who favored a 
strong, centralized federal court system had to contend with those who feared a loss of autonomy by the 
individual states,  and [a]lthough reports of the congressional debates are sparse, it is apparent that the 
advocates of state interests carried the day ); GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 539 40 ( If there was truth in the 
antifederalists  charge that the most ardent federalists were aiming at a consolidated  government, the Act for 
Regulating Processes in its final form was a defeat for such ambitions. ). 
228. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 17, at 647. 
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